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1 Introduction
Few case studies highlight as clearly the intersection
of globalisation with poverty as the role of
biotechnology in the developing world.The “gene”
revolution in agricultural biotechnology is being
driven by some of themost powerful multinational
companies in the global economy, including such
giants as Monsanto and Du Pont. The absence of
effective regulatory frameworks and safeguards for
monitoring the handling and use of biotechnologies
brings into sharp relief the limits of state capacity,
while the pace of technological development in the
sector far outstrips the ability of legal frameworks
to manage its consequences. The politics of aid,
trade and redistribution that modern biotechnology
has given rise to, amid claims about the ability of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to feed the
world,make it a pressing development issue on the
agendas of governments and global institutions.
What can these institutions do to manage the
technology in a way which benefits the poor?How,
in constructing mechanisms of international
governance to regulate the social and environmental
consequences of modern biotechnology, can they
ensure that the food security of the poor is
safeguarded?
At first sight, it would seem unreasonable to
expect the activities of international institutions to
have much consequence for the lives of the rural
poor in the developing world. Yet, as donors and
academics are increasingly emphasising, global
institutions inmany ways mediate the relationship
between globalisation and poverty, of which food
insecurity is one manifestation. Trade rules and
environmental regulations that bear directly upon
the rights and responsibilities of governments
impinging in positive and negative ways upon their
“food sovereignty” are now in place. The ability of
developing country governments in particular, to
make pro-poor policy choices in agriculture is being
circumscribed by a combination of rules on
agricultural and food trade policy and on intellectual
property rights. These rules define the conditions
upon which countries can prohibit or restrict the
import of certain agricultural products, or promote
or access specific technologies in order to address
food security needs.
These issues formed the background to a project
on ‘Globalisation and the InternationalGovernance
ofModern Biotechnology’, some of the findings of
which are summarised in this article. The project
sought to examine the relationships between, for
example, theWorldTradeOrganization (WTO), the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CBP) and other
international organisations addressingbiotechnology,
as well as the interaction between these bodies and
national governments in developing countries. It
also sought to identify where and how the agri-
biotech industry is influencing policy processes both
at the national and international level.The aim was
to identify constraints upon national policy makers
in formulating policy on biotechnology that accords
with obligations to international organisations and
meets the food security needs of poorer farming
communities; to explore the role and limitations of
national regulation of biotechnology in the context
of globalisation and to consider the extent to which
international institutions can supplement the ability
of governments to promote food security.The focus
was on transgenic crop biotechnologies, whichhave
generated most concern about their potential
environmental,health and socio-economic impacts.
Our interest was in the implications of efforts to
regulate these impacts through global regimes on
trade, food and the environment on national level
efforts in India andKenya to combat food insecurity.
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2 Food security: the missing
agenda
Amid the global debate about the pros and cons of
biotechnology for the poor, our starting point has
been to look at the role of institutions and the rela-
tions of power that they embody, in order to
understand the extent to which the leading global
institutions in the biotech debate are likely to be
able to respond to the food security needs of the
poor. This emphasis comes amid increasing claims
that such institutions are key to harnessing the
potential of globalisation to tackle poverty (DFID
2000).
While recognising the potential for these
institutions to work for the poor, our work sug-
gests that the institutions of global governance
currently active on the issue of biotechnology are
failing adequately to address the needs of the
poor, at least in terms of their ability to address
food security concerns, the area of greatest
potential benefit from the technology for the
poor. We found evidence of a disconnect
between the content and orientation of the inter-
national mechanisms that have been developed
to “govern” biotechnology and the nature of the
policy mechanisms that governments have tradi-
tionally made use of and, in some cases continue
to deploy, in order to enhance food security. This
tension has emerged in a number of contexts.
First, we noted conflicts between the
demands of many domestic producers and farm-
ers groups for forms of domestic protection from
exposure to foreign markets such as subsidies,
and the requirements of the WTO’s Agreement
on Agriculture for the lifting of quantitative
restrictions and removal of some forms of sub-
sidy protection (Dhar and Dey 2002).
Second, we noted the conflict that emerged in
the Biosafety Protocol negotiations over whether
and how socio-economic considerations would
be treated in the Protocol. In the end, language
was adopted whose implications are not yet
entirely clear, which focuses on socio-economic
impacts associated with biodiversity loss
(Mackenzie 2003). Broader formulations that
might have allowed countries to consider
impacts such as the impact on access to afford-
able food, loss of livelihood and income, or
impacts on employment from market displace-
ment, etc. were opposed by GMO-exporting
countries (and by most other developed coun-
tries) as unjustifiable trade barriers (Stabinsky
2000).
Third, we noted that, though seed sharing and
exchange and informal processes of innovation
are key to the maintenance of food security in
many rural areas, some forms of plant variety
protection and intellectual property regimes
restrict these types of practices. For these rea-
sons, both India and Kenya initially supported
the idea of excluding living and biological mate-
rials from patent protection although post-TRIPs
(Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights) their ability to do so has been curtailed
(Ramakrishna 2003; Odame et al. 2003).
A fourth and more general tension derives
from the relationship between diversity and
autonomy in national priority-setting around
biotechnology issues and the thrust of many
international initiatives towards harmonisation
of safety regimes and universalisation of risk
assessment procedures. This issue arises in rela-
tion to questions of patent protection and the
role of socio-economic considerations, but is also
expressed in the challenge posed to a country’s
food sovereignty by trade disciplines. While
some of the measures described above might be
thought to be key for the protection of food secu-
rity, alongside a raft of measures such as protec-
tion for infant seed industries and active discrim-
ination between domestic and foreign food pro-
ducers, the imperatives of trade liberalisation
have been invoked to question and challenge the
scope that national governments have to formu-
late such policies as well as their legal compati-
bility with global trade accords.
A fifth tension we observed derives from the
higher priority given to food safety over food
security concerns in the work of bodies such as
Codex and the way in which the WTO agree-
ments on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) have
been employed to date. A repeated theme has
been the relative absence among the institutions
of international governance handling biotechnol-
ogy issues of bodies whose primary mandate is
the promotion of food security (Mackenzie
2003). Questions have been asked about the role
of bodies such as the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) and the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), but the
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former is seen by many developing countries to
be too uncritical about the role of biotechnology
in tackling food security to be a reliable ally and
IFAD is generally regarded as too weak, lacking
in resources to play an effectual role.
A sixth problem is that the very actors whose
activities increasingly impact most directly on the
livelihoods of the rural poor are currently those
whose operations are least regulated by international
law: transnational corporations.One of the greatest
threats posed to the supply of affordable seeds
tailored to local conditions is the consolidation
within the global seed industry and the trend
towards mergers and acquisitions (UKFoodGroup,
undated). The dumping of their products on
developing country markets is permitted by
subsidies to farmers in theNorth, which continue
to be a bone of contention in global trade talks.
Beyond this, the activities of a broader set of
international institutions, whose role in this debate
was beyond the scope of our study, are also key to
food security. In this regard, the activities of the
WorldBank and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF)
in determining questions of access as well as shaping
themarkets and institutions that mediate between
suppliers of food, public and private and the rural
poor, is critical. Alongside these principally
economic actors, we also noted the role of
organisations such as International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) more generally, in promoting biotech-
nology as a possible solution to food security. The
activities of these bodies may havemore of a direct
bearing on the research orientation of national
agricultural research centres and the incentives and
disincentives they face when considering technology
options than the global politics of trade described
in this article which clearly impact more on globally-
traded commercial crops than on innovations
intended for local use and consumption. In other
words, many of those technological innovations
which may make the most direct contribution
towards the food security of the poor, tackling crops
and traits for which there is high levels of demand
from resource poor farmers,may be unaffected by
the broader global politics we describe here.
However, the vast majority of current agri-biotech
developments are not focused on these crops and
traits and yet have serious implications for the food
security of the poor in positive and negative and
direct and indirect ways, and it is these technologies
that are the subject of the international regulations
that we have explored in this project.
3 The limits of multilateralism
Despite the great faith that is placed in multilat-
eral institutions, our work has underscored the
need to keep in mind the limits of multilateral-
ism in producing effective outcomes and in over-
seeing a process that is beneficial to developing
countries in particular.
First, a key trend, which emerges from our
work, is the ongoing importance of bilateralism
in a world of multilateral institutions. This can
take a number of forms, but essentially includes
various forms of bilateral political pressure from
powerful states towards weaker developing
countries. This leverage is underpinned by the
dependence of developing countries on trade
and aid. There have been many reported exam-
ples of developing countries subject to strong
forms of political pressure to revise their biosafe-
ty regulations in line with the interests and con-
cerns of powerful exporting countries. Bolivia,
Sri Lanka, Egypt, Croatia and Thailand have all
reportedly been subject to bilateral pressures to
relax the stringency of their regulatory systems or
to retreat from de facto moratoria on the technol-
ogy’s import and development within the coun-
try. In the case of China, changes were made to
the development of regulations of labelling and
import following a high-profile visit from
President Bush and a delegation of trade officials
(Newell 2003a).
Clearly these pressures have not just been
applied to developing countries, as the recent
complaint by the USA and others at the WTO
against the EU’s alleged de facto moratorium on
GM crops highlights. But the particular vulnera-
bility of developing countries to the threat of
trade action or the withdrawal of much needed
aid carries extra significance. Such pressures are
also applied within multilateral fora. A number
of representatives from developing country dele-
gations recalled “threats”, as they described
them, from GMO exporters of withdrawals of aid
in the absence of them adopting of a more com-
pliant position towards the needs of GMO
exporting countries (Newell and Glover 2003).
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In light of the failure of the Cancun talks, we can
expect renewed emphasis by the USA and others
on seeking market access through bilateral deals
on biotechnology and other issues rather than
awaiting the resolution of complex conflicts
through multilateral means. While larger devel-
oping countries may be able to stand up to such
pressure, smaller countries inevitably have less
leverage to resist the demands of powerful
exporters. This state-based lobbying will be
backed up, as in the past, by pressure from
biotech firms themselves threatening relocation
or refusing to invest in a country unless a more
accommodating government position is taken
(Newell and Glover 2003).
Multilateral fora will continue to be key how-
ever, and there remains a need to address the lim-
ited nature of participation of developing coun-
tries in global policy processes. This results from
the process inequities associated with the organi-
sation and nature of multilateral processes. Issues
here include the financial resources required to be
able to attend negotiations which limits the num-
ber of delegates that a country can send, and
which in turn constrains the number of meetings,
often held simultaneously, at which a country can
be represented. Lack of capacity to engage fully in
all aspects of international negotiating processes,
which culminate in adoption of a “package deal”,
such as the WTO single undertaking, has meant
that a number of developing countries may have
only fully appreciated the range and scope of
obligations they had agreed to by signing up to
the Uruguay Round and the TRIPs Agreement in
particular, once they had done so.
Issues of capacity also plague the process of
translating global commitments into practice at
the national level. There are problems of conflicts
over interpretation of agreements and the consis-
tency between different, and potentially compet-
ing, bodies of international law. There are also
more fundamental issues of capacity to manage
the requirements made of countries by interna-
tional agreements. Hence in the case of intellectu-
al property rights, developing countries have
argued that they are not in a position to protect
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the same way
as developed countries. The response has been
the provision of capacity-building support to
patent offices from World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO) or WTO. Concerns have
been expressed by people working in those
patent offices, however, that the “support” and
training they receive from bodies such as WIPO
and WTO does not reflect national priorities and
in some ways pre-judges what their needs will be,
especially in the case of countries that have yet to
join the WTO. There is concern that capacity-
building is oriented towards speeding up the reg-
istering of patents for foreign companies seeking
market access rather than exploring options for
designing a patenting system that protects key
crops and publicly owned innovations from being
patented for exclusive use. In this sense, capacity-
building efforts could seek to ensure that patent
offices and judicial bodies in developing coun-
tries understand flexibilities available under
TRIPs and implications of different interpreta-
tions of key terms, including how such terms
were interpreted by developed country patent
offices and courts. There are strong arguments to
support increased time-frames for TRIPs imple-
mentation for all developing countries, not just
least-developed countries, in order to craft sui
generis options for IPRs relating to plant varieties
and biotechnological innovations.
If they are to be implemented, international
agreements need to make realistic demands of
national regulatory systems. The Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety is centred on an effective
system of national import licensing and advance
informed agreement that places resource and
capacity demands on bureaucracies that they
may not be in a position to meet, particularly in
developing country settings. There have now
been numerous incidents of accidental release
and illegal growing and trading in seeds which
governments have been unaware of, for example,
the illegal sale and growing of Bt cotton in
Gujarat state, India (Dhar 2003). The ungovern-
ability of seeds as an object of regulation expos-
es, once again, the limits of what we can expect
multilateral processes to achieve. The informal
exchange of GM and non-GM seeds is very diffi-
cult to track and monitor. Problems of GM food
aid and controlling the use of seeds entering the
market as aid, underscore this pattern of
ungovernability and help to explain concerns
expressed by Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia
regarding the receipt of GM food aid from the
USA in particular, and the impact this may have
on genetic diversity within their countries
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through leakage and illegal growing. Though this
clearly raises issues of capacity, it is not just a
problem for developing countries, as instances of
unauthorised releases in the UK as well as of cor-
porations not having control of their own prod-
ucts, such as StarLink in the USA, testify. The
issue is not just one of capacity, therefore, but of
the nature of “genetic pollution” and the difficul-
ties associated with its control, however effective
a system of regulation is claimed to be. With
regard to implementation and enforcement, par-
ticularly where regulatory structures are weak or
under-resourced, non-state actors may assume
an important role in monitoring. However, in
reaching decisions on whether to import partic-
ular GMOs, countries may need to take into
account their limited capacity to monitor and
enforce effective risk management measures.
A further problem associated with the export,
through multilateral agencies, of particular
approaches to the governance of biotechnology, is
that they tend to overlook significant ecological
and socio-economic differences within societies,
in addition to their political peculiarities, described
above. There is a tendency in risk assessment
approaches, advocated by bodies such as theOECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) and supported by industry groups
keen tominimise interference in trade (Newell and
Glover 2003), to assume that conditions in one
country prevail everywhere. By trying to reduce
regulatory hurdles and encourage concepts such
as substantial equivalence and familiarity, which
reduce the need for new testing, risk assessment
procedures tailored to the agro-ecological conditions
prevailing in different regions of the same country
even,may be overlooked. This has implications for
food security particularly in countries that are
centres of origin or diversity for key crops (such as
maize in Mexico) and where smallholder farmers
are dependent on local varieties of staple crops
(Odame et al. 2003). Not only does the level of
socially acceptable risk differ by society, such that
global benchmarks are often inappropriate, but the
range of tests that a country might want to undertake
particularly in settings such as these, where crops
that are central to a country’s food security may be
affected by imports of GMOs, requires a greater
degree of flexibility for nationally attuned
frameworks for risk assessment than is possible at
the moment. While the CBP is ambiguous about
the scope for socio-economic assessments,
examining the socio-economic implications of
potential impacts of GM crops on local varieties
and of reduced reliance on local varieties in itself
might provide a useful screening mechanism for
identifying food security implications.
4 The “shadow of WTO”:
international trade rules and
biotechnology policy
A major theme throughout our research has been
the pivotal role of theWTO in framing the context
within which both national and international
institutions are addressing the governance of
modern biotechnology, both in terms of regulation
and property rights. This emerged in a number of
different contexts, and could be said to include both
direct and indirect impacts on national and
international policy making. Areas of influence
include: the impact ofWTO rules on national law
and policy, through requiring adaptation of national
level regulations to comply withWTO disciplines,
for example under the TRIPs Agreement; the
influence of WTO rules on the negotiation of
international agreements, for example the Biosafety
Protocol; the bilateralisation or regionalisation of
WTO disciplines in free trade agreements; and the
impact of the potential for challenge to national
health and environmental standards through the
WTO dispute settlement system.
Though not unique to biotechnology, the
influence of WTO rules over national laws and
regulations on matters such as trade in goods,
labelling and intellectual property rights is striking.
In this respect, theWTOhas either directly required,
in the case of intellectual property, or has promoted
and underpinned, in the case of sanitary and
phytosanitary regulation, international harmonisation
of standards (Mackenzie 2003). Inmany respects,
the WTO Agreements have imposed a significant
legislative burden on developing countries (e.g.
Odame et al. 2003; Ramakrishna 2003). For
example, the TRIPs Agreement has been
instrumental in setting the time-frames and contours
of national intellectual property laws, as they relate,
in particular, to protection of plant varieties and
other living organisms. As countries seek to meet
the deadlines for implementation of their obligations
under TRIPs, timemay not permit full consideration
of whether or not new intellectual property laws
meet (or do not meet) national needs, priorities and
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interests, including those related to food security.
The same problem to some extent applies to the
International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plans (UPOV) agreement where the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR)
has noted that ‘it provides a ready made legislative
framework, but a disadvantage is that it was
designed with the commercialised farming systems
of developed countries in mind’ (CIPR 2002: 69).
The Indian case study in our project showed,
however, how a country can undertake a more
broad-based consultation and consideration with
a view to incorporating a form of farmers’ rights
into its national plant variety rights legislation,
resulting in the adoption of the Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers Rights Act (PPVFRA) in this
case (Seshia 2002).
Notwithstanding the incorporation of provisions
on special and differential treatment in the WTO
Agreements, the drive to harmonisation and trade
liberalisation has failed to accommodate the
differentiated capacities and priorities of countries
at different stages of development.This is especially
problematic in a relatively new area such as
biotechnology. While many developing country
governments have expressed strong interest in
exploring the potential of biotechnology in
agriculture, at the same time concerns exist owing
to gaps in the understanding of the potential health,
environmental and socio-economic impacts of the
technology and in the capacity to assess andmanage
such risks. This is exacerbated by the influence of
WTO rules, both in constraining national policy
making, and on other international organisations
whichmight otherwise be expected to providemore
policy space for governments to address the food
security and other socio-economic implications of
modern biotechnology.
Despite the adoption of specific international
instruments on biosafety, the need for WTO
compliance and the threat of challenge under WTO
rules may have a “chilling effect” on national safety
regulations, and on related legislation such as
labelling rules. For example, China’s proposed new
laws on import regulation and labelling of GMOs
were delayed after pressure from the USA and
followingChina’s accession to theWTO, which has
necessitated extensive review and amendment of
national laws (Newell 2003b). Thus, the influence
of theWTO also operates indirectly, through trade
diplomacy withmajor trading partners and powers.
The imperatives of trade liberalisation become then
the reference point for discussions of issues of
biosafety and food security. Increasingly, policy
interventions in these areas have to be validated by
demonstrating that they do not raise unnecessary
or discriminatory barriers to trade.This has serious
implications for the national autonomy of
governments whose policies on food security and
environmental risk are increasingly subject to trade
disciplines through agreements such as TRIPs, the
SPS and TBT Agreements and the Agreement on
Agriculture.
The “shadow of theWTO” is also discernible in
the international negotiations themselves, notably
in the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol and in
ongoing discussions in the Intergovernmental
Committee on theCartagena Protocol, as well as in
theCodex Alimentarius and in the InternationalPlant
Protection Convention (IPPC) (Mackenzie 2003).
With regard to the IPPC and theCodex, it is notable
that certain WTO Agreements have conferred a
privileged status upon formally non-binding
international guidelines and standards, thus “raising
the stakes” of international standard-setting processes
(Mackenzie 2003; Victor 2000; Marceau and
Trachtman 2002).However, the ability of developing
countries toparticipate inCodex andother standard-
setting bodies, and to implement international
standards, has been weak, and has only recently
begun to be addressed. In addition, the principles
of the WTO are increasingly being replicated or
reflected in other fora, including the standard-setting
bodies themselves (Mackenzie 2003).
Notwithstanding recent movement towards
harmonisation of international standards, there
remains a degree of unpredictability of outcome
with regard to the application of regulatory measures
governing GMOs and with regard to potential
challenges to such measures. Policy ambiguities
and uncertainties, as well as gaps, exist.For example,
nine years after the adoption of the TRIPs
Agreement, there is continuing uncertainty as to
what may be patentable (e.g. plants, plant varieties,
animals) and what must be patented (e.g. micro-
organisms, non-biological processes, etc.); and as
to when flexibilities under TRIPs, such as
compulsory licensing,might be used (Yamin 2003).
In addition, it is not clear how, to what extent,
and which socio-economic considerations might
be taken into account in decisionmaking on imports
ofGMOs (Stabinsky 2000). Some socio-economic
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concerns, which seem likely to be of potential
concern to developing countries related toGMOs,
may not necessarily fall within the scope of Article
26 of the Biosafety Protocol, which in any event
requires countries to act consistently with their
other international obligations, including those
under the WTO, when taking socio-economic
considerations into account in decisionmaking on
GMOs. To some extent, these uncertainties might
leave space for national regulatory autonomy. But
they also leave developing countries open to
considerable pressure from GM exporters and
environmental activists alike about how they choose
to interpret the precautionary principle.
One mechanism for resolving conflicts is of
course theWTO’s dispute settlement system. This
has been used in relation to TRIPs, for example in
litigation initiated by the USA against Argentina
concerning patentability ofmicro-organisms (Yamin
2003). The approach of the Appellate Body, in
particular, in addressing Article XX of theGeneral
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
provisions of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, indicates that
there is scope for a country to justify restrictions
on imports ofGMOs on environmental and health
grounds. However, since the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round and the formalisation of the role
of dispute settlement in theWTO, concerns have
been expressed that the dispute settlement system,
which is designed to underpin the rule-based
system, does not itself provide a level playing field.
First, the process of dispute settlement may be too
costly in terms of human and financial resources
required. Second, the most effective remedies
available under theWTO are bilateral, such as the
suspension of concessions including cross-
retaliation. Yet these remedies are less appropriate
for developing countries, with their relative lack of
trading power. The lack of transparency in dispute
settlement proceedings, both as regards other WTO
members and as regards civil society has provoked
disquiet. And concerns about the WTO dispute
settlement system have also been expressed
regarding the role of businesses in prompting their
national governments to mount a challenge in the
WTO to other countries’ measures which restrict
market access for biotech products. While the
Dispute Settlement Understanding is under review,
it remains to be seen to what extent reforms will
address the concerns of developing countries.
The disciplines imposed by the WTO and the
frameworks promoted through instruments such
as the Protocol and theCodex highlight competing
principles of harmonisation, on the one hand, and
diversity on the other. This tension is reflected at
the national and international level, and operates
between different international institutions, for
example the Convention on Biological Diversity
with its emphasis on national circumstances and
priorities compared with the drive for harmonisation
and international minimum standards in TRIPs.
The “single undertaking” principle of the WTO,
notwithstanding the accommodation of the
principle of special and differential treatment for
developing countries, restricts the policy space
available to developing countries (and indeed to
other countries) to address needs, priorities and
preferences in relation to agricultural biotechnology.
In this regard, developing countries are forced to
make trade-offs as they develop national policy,
and also as they formulate negotiating positions for
the various international fora addressing GMOs.
Thus, while most developing countries supported
a strong Biosafety Protocol, incorporating socio-
economic considerations, and taking precedence
over relevant WTO obligations, in theWTO itself,
they have been wary of efforts to address trade and
environment issues, including the link between the
WTO andmultilateral environmental agreements,
for fear that such developments might further
hamper access of their goods to developed country
markets. The principle and operationalisation of
special and differential treatment in the WTO
meanwhile is yet to be clarified in ameaningful way
and remains under negotiation.
5 Conclusion
Many of the problems we have described in this
article are not unique to biotechnology, even if they
take on more critical dimensions in the context of
the food security of the poor. There have also been
some efforts to address them. But despite numerous
international initiatives devoted to avoidance of
duplication, and to enhancing synergy and inter-
linkages between international institutions, it is not
clear that these are resulting in real improvements
in the international governance of modern
biotechnology. There have been improvements in
information exchange and cross-representation
among international organisations and a gradual
increase in the recognition of the range of interests
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and actors that need to be brought into the debate.
There is still a long way to go, however, before
pivotal decision-making fora can be said to have
integrated food security concerns into their current
and future programmes.Creating new institutions
specifically to address modern biotechnology is
unlikely to be an effective solution, however.While
an initiative along the lines of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change has been mooted by the
OECD, our research suggests a series of location,
environment and context-specific interventions are
more likely to be effective.
Faced with constraints imposed by the
international institutions described above, one
possible response is forum shifting: seeking tomove
the debate, or elements of it, into amore responsive
international forum. Rather than forum-shopping
for more responsive, inclusive institutions that are
weak within the overall process, however, it is
important to promote the participation and interests
of developing countries within the WTO itself.
Looking to institutions such as UNCTAD, that are
both active on the biotech issue and seemingly and
traditionally more responsive to the concerns of
developing countries,may be appealing. But there
are questions about the ability of such organisations
to respond to developing country concerns on the
biotech issue; whether they have the capacity to do
what is expected of them. For reasons of lack of
funding and breadth of mandate, a body such as
UNCTAD may not be well placed to shift the
regulatory agendas of bodies such as theWTO.
If we accept that food security should not be
constrained by prevailing trade disciplines, then
we cannot ignore the role of bodies such as the
WTO in this debate. There are sound social and
economic reasons why controls on imports are
sometimes necessary to protect fragilemarkets and
vulnerable groups from the consequences of full
market exposure, especially where environmental,
health and socio-economic impacts are uncertain
and potentially damaging. Forcing countries to
accept GM products through resort to trade and
aid pressures runs counter to the need for countries
to consider whether they want biotechnology,
having assessed its implications, and if so, under
what conditions and with what safeguards in place.
At the moment, the democratic space in which to
make that assessment is being closed down.
Ironically, the net effect may be to generate
resentment towards an imposed technology, without
adequately considering its potential advantages.
In turn, this requires international institutions
to bemore flexible in the time-frames within which
they allow countries to set up biosafety frameworks,
for example, to allow time for fuller forms of
consultation and public participation. This is
important for anticipating negative impacts as well
as the positive potential of particular biotechnology
developments for the food security of the poor.
However, for such processes to be legitimate and
for groups to consider engaging in them worthwhile,
they have to make a difference. If governments’
hands are to some extent tied by their existing
international obligations and certain policy options
are already off the agenda, it will be difficult to
persuade citizen groups to engage in exercises in
public consultation and participation if they feel
the government cannot, ultimately, act on their
demands.
Harmonised approaches to regulation and risk
assessment run the danger of closing down public
spaces for citizens to debate which biotechnology
future they want and why, and of reducing the scope
for countries and groups within countries to
prioritise the role of biotechnology in tackling food
insecurity in their own (different) ways. Many
capacity-building programmes such as those
overseen by UNEP-Global Environment Facility
(GEF) have focused on the creation of toolkits and
clearly sequenced policy processes that should be
undertaken in the design of a country’s national
biosafety framework. They have strongly
emphasised government control of the process, the
importance of experts in “informing” the public
about what they need to know about biotechnology
and biosafety and the need to narrow public
involvement to discussion of issues on terms set by
the Protocol. Such an approach, reflecting clear
bureaucratic imperatives for standard forms of
policy implementation, is unlikely to be conducive
to the construction of more open and inclusive
society-owned spaces for policy dialogue on issues
of national priority including food security.
But increased levels of public participation will
not be sufficient to shift the debate towards amore
serious treatment of food security concerns. In the
absence of efforts to redress the power inequalities
that keep these issues off the policy agenda and
concentrate power in the hands of a policy and
commercial elite, such measures will have a
negligible overall effect. New mechanisms to
Whose Rules Rule? Development and the Global Governance of Biotechnology
89
enhance the accountability of the private sector are
therefore required. These may include enhancing
the use of competition law to prevent monopolistic
practices in the agricultural biotechnology and seed
sectors. The mergers of AstraZeneca and Novartis
to form Syngenta and of Aventis CropScience and
Bayer to form Bayer CropScience illustrate the
propensity for corporate concentration in the
biotech sector and the implications this has for
farmer choice.For example,Monsanto has increased
its market share of the Brazilianmaizemarket from
zero to 60 per cent in just two years, with the result
that only one Brazilian company now remains in
that sector with a market share of only 5 per cent
(NuffieldCouncil onBioEthics 2003).Wemay need
to consider restricting the scope of claims for
commercial confidentiality where these limit public
access to information and participation in decision
making.Restricting the application of broad patents
would also represent a timely intervention. The
recent Nuffield Council on BioEthics report
recommends that: ‘owners of patented technology
should be encouraged to licence their technology
non-exclusively, that patent offices should avoid
the granting of overly broad patents and that the
impact of patents on access to germplasm should
bemonitored’ (NuffieldCouncil onBioEthics 2003).
Getting such controversial issues onto the agenda
of theWTO will clearly not be easy. Yet, the recent
breakdown of the world trade talks inCancunmay
suggest the emergence of a political dynamic in the
global politics of trade in which developing
countries are willing and able to exercise a veto over
developments they consider to be against their
interests. China’s membership of the WTO,
mounting frustration at the lack of progress in
delivering a “development round” and the ongoing
critical spotlight on theWTO’s activities provided
by protests from elements within civil society have
contributed to this change of events. Such
developments may represent the best hope yet that
developing countries can force concessions from
the developed world across a range of issue areas.
Biotechnology also goes to the heart of
fundamental debates about how far trade rules
should be allowed to override international rules
that restrict trade for the purpose of social or
environmental protection. Such concerns are
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expressed in the title of this article, ‘Whose rules
rule?’, taken from the trade campaign of the
development NGO, the World Development
Movement. This raises key democratic questions
about the respective rights and responsibilities of
states and international institutions; how much
autonomy can legitimately be preserved for
development policy choices in the face of
universalising rules?Do the investment rights of a
company trump the rights of a government to
determine which forms of investment it considers
to be good for development?The contest over these
issues forms the battleground on which the future
of biotechnology will be fought out.
Notes
* This study draws on work done as part of the project
‘Globalisation and the International Governance of
Modern Biotechnology’, financed by a research grant
from theUKDepartment for InternationalDevelopment
(DFID).DFID supports policies,programmes andprojects
to promote international development and provided
funds for this study as part of that objective, but the views
and opinions expressed are those of the authors alone.
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